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Temporary Restraining Orders As
Unconstitutional Prior Restraints
On Mass Labor Picketing
United Farm Workers v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 902, 537
P.2d 1237, 122 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1975).
I. INTRODUCTION
The temporary restraining order is an ex parte injunction,
issued without notice or prior hearing. In United Farm Workers
v. Superior Court,' the constitutionality of an ex parte temporary
restraining order issued in an agricultural labor dispute was at-
tacked under the first and fourteenth amendments to the federal
Constitution and article I, section 2 of the California constitution 2
as a prior restraint on free speech. This case presented the issue
of whether peaceful mass labor picketing is subject to ex parte
injunctive restraint.
In United Farm Workers, the United Farm Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, was engaged in mass picketing at the William Buak
Fruit Company apple orchard. The fruit company filed a com-
plaint alleging interference with ingress and egress to the orchard,
inducement of fear of physical violence, and trespass for the
purpose of coercing employees to cease work. Interference with
the harvesting of the apple crop valued in excess of $500,000 was
cited as the irreparable injury required for injunctive relief.3
1. 14 Cal. 3d 902, 537 P.2d 1237, 122 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1975).
2. "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her senti-
ments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right.
A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL.
CONST., art. I, § 2.
3. The adequacy test for injunctive relief requires that the injury threat-
ened be irreparable, or as sometimes stated, that the legal remedy be
inadequate. To prevail on a motion for a temporary restraining order,
the movant must show (1) a substantial probability of success at trial
and (2) immediate danger of irreparable injury. Nebraska Dep't of
Roads v. Tiemann, 510 F.2d 446, 447 (8th Cir. 1975); Minnesota Bear-
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Neither the labor union nor any of its individual members were
given formal or informal notice of the request for the temporary
restraining order.4 The Superior Court of Santa Cruz County is-
sued a temporary restraining order on September 30, 1974, which
enjoined the labor union from entering the fruit company's prop-
erty or physically obstructing persons or vehicles entering or leav-
ing the property. The restraining order also "limited the number
of pickets allowed at or near the fruit company property . .. and
required the permissible number of pickets allowed ... to be
spaced at certain minimum intervals."5 The temporary restraining
order was replaced with a preliminary injunction6 on October 17,
1974 after an adversary hearing. The issue was appealed to the
California Supreme Court on a writ of prohibition7 challenging
whether the temporary restraining order could constitutionally be
continued. The court found substantial free speech interests in-
volved in picketing and held that the first and fourteenth amend-
ments to the federal Constitution and article I, section 2 of the
California constitution require notice and opportunity to be heard
before the issuance of temporary restraining orders when sub-
stantial free speech interests are at stake.8
ing Co. v. White Motor Corp., 470 F.2d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1973);
CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 527 (West Supp. 1976).
4. 14 Cal. 3d at 905-06, 537 P.2d at 1239, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
5. Id. at 906 n.2, 537 P.2d at 1239 n.2, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 879 n.2.
6. A temporary restraining order is granted ex parte upon request to
the court, is limited in time and self-dissolves at the expiration of
the term fixed.
A preliminary injunction is granted after a curtailed hearing at
which the use of affidavits from both sides is common, and at which
oral testimony is often taken. A preliminary injunction lasts only
until a trial on the merits or earlier dissolution by the court. State
ex rel. Beck v. Associate Discount Corp., 161 Neb. 410, 73 N.W.2d
673 (1955).
A permanent injunction is granted after a full trial on the merits
and is unlimited in duration. Developments in the Law-Injunctions,
78 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1055 (1965).
7. The defendant's use of a writ of prohibition avoided the general lack
of appealability of temporary restraining orders. As a general rule,
a temporary restraining order is not appealable because it is not a
final decree. The writ of prohibition, however, is immune from the
finality rule. Prohibition provides a useful method to collaterally
attack the lower court's action. Developments in the Law-Injunc-
tions, supra note 6, at 1060, 1077.
8. 14 Cal. 3d at 913, 537 P.2d at 1244, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 884. But see
Hudgeons v. NLRB, 44 U.S.L.W. 4281 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976), where the
Court held that rights and liabilities of labor pickets are dependent
exclusively upon the National Labor Relations Act because first
amendment rights were not involved. Thus the only basis for relief in
a case like United Farm Workers may be the free speech provisions
of state constitutions.
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II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The court's analysis 9 began with an examination of two pro-
cedural defects of the ex parte proceeding: a shortage of factual
and legal contentions, and the problem of drafting ex parte orders.
In ex parte proceedings, only the complaining party's side of the
story is available.10 The Superior Court which issued the restrain-
ing order had only a verified complaint and three one-page affi-
davits signed by interested parties." The purpose of the ex parte
procedure is to preserve the status quo in cases where the subject
matter is in imminent danger of destruction or removal or where
giving prior notice to the defendant would result in the inability
to provide any final relief at all.12 The statutory scheme of sharply
limited duration of ex parte orders is designed as a safeguard to
restrict the possible adverse effects of orders granted without notice
or opportunity to be heard.'3 Thus, the ex parte procedure subjects
a defendant to injunctive restraint when he has heard nothing prior
9. The question of mootness arises in all cases of temporary restraining
orders. The order is of limited duration, lasting only ten days in
California or 20 days if good cause is shown, and self-dissolves at the
end of the time period or is replaced by a preliminary injunction
after a hearing. Even though the order has expired, a court may
find the case not moot if it believes that review will continually be
defeated by short term orders. 14 Cal. 3d at 907, 537 P.2d at 1240,
122 Cal. Rptr. at 880, quoting from Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v.
ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). See Note, Mootness on Appeal in the
Supreme Court, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1672, 1680-86 (1970). If ex parte
restraining orders with a duration long enough to last through the
harvesting of a grower's crop could easily be obtained there would
be no way to test whether protected rights were being unconstitu-
tionally infringed. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307
(1967). But see In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 273 (1968).
10. There does not seem to be any case law defining the appli-
cable standards for judging the quality and character of an
affidavit offered in support of a motion under [Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure] 65(b). Since a temporary restraining
order generally is sought on short notice, in a case of pressing
need, and Rule 65(b) expressly permits its issuance on the
presentation of a verified complaint, it probably is unsound
to hold the affidavits to too rigorous a standard.... [T]he
evidentiary quality of the affidavit must be sufficient to con-
vince a court that there is immediate and great danger of
irreparable injury that necessitates the temporary dispensing
of some trappings of due process.
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Civil § 2952,
515-16 (1973).
11. 14 Cal. 3d at 908, 537 P.2d at 1241, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
12. Developments in the Law-Injunctions, supra note 6, at 1060.
13. Carrol v. Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968).
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to the serving of the order and of which he has had no opportunity
to resist.'14
To frame a temporary restraining order, the court must act
quickly; the facts must be found fast.15 Hindered by a lack of
presentation by both sides, the resulting order may be vague or
overbroad.
Vagueness exists when the delineation of the range of pro-
hibited activity lacks particularity. Vagueness creates several
problems. First, vague laws may not provide adequate warning.
"[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordin-
ary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is pro-
hibited, so that he may act accordingly."'16 Second, as a corollary
to the fair warning problem, the uncertain meanings of vague laws
lead people to stay further away from the boundary of the for-
bidden Conduct than if explicit standards were provided. Where
a vague law abuts upon sensitive areas of basic first amendment
freedoms, "... it operates to inhibit the exercise of those free-
doms."'17 Third, because vague laws fail to provide explicit stand-
ards, those who apply vague laws must make basic policy decisions.
If arbitrary and discriminatory application is to be prevented,
then explicit standards must be provided.'"
Breadth refers to the range of activity within the parameters
of the order. Even if an order is clear and precise, it may never-
theless be unconstitutionally overbroad if it prohibits constitution-
ally protected conduct as well as unprotected activity.19 The vice of
an overbroad law is not only the actual application, but the deter-
rent impact, or chilling effect, on protected conduct.20  "The
paradigm of a 'narrow' law is ... one which focuses with speci-
ficity on harm-inducing features and circumstances of action which
are only fortuitously related to expressive and associational fea-
tures."'2 ' Because there is a lack of presentation by both sides
which hinders drafting of orders in the narrowest terms that will
accomplish the pin-pointed objective, ex parte restraining orders
may sweep more broadly than necessary.
14. Developments in the Law-Injunctions, supra note 6, at 1060.
15. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION, 34-35 (1930).
16. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); Coates v. City
of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
17. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109, quoting from Cramp
v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961).
18. 408 U.S. at 108-09.
19. 408 U.S. 104 (1972); cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
20. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAuv. L. REv.
844, 853-54 (1970).
21. Id. at 859.
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III. THE COURT'S OPINION
The court held that the restraining order affected first amend-
ment rights in two respects: (1) by limiting the right of access
to the migrant labor camp on the fruit company's property and (2)
by limiting picketing.
The court found a first amendment right of access "which
belongs both to labor camp inhabitants and to union organizers
or attorneys who seek to visit them."2 2 The court, without discus-
sion, relied upon cases holding that the occupants of a labor camp
have a right to the free flow of information and visitors.23  For
the court, the fruit company's fifth amendment private property
rights of the labor camp located on company property did not
suspend the worker's first amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech, religion and assembly. 24 The court found that cases
involving picketing at shopping center malls25 were not pertinent
to this case, apparently because the union's organizational activity
had a direct relation to the fruit orchard being picketed. 2C
In contrast, the dissenting opinion of Justice Clark argued that
"the right to private property is protected against intrusion by one
asserting his right to speech."2 7 The dissenting opinion subordin-
ated private property rights to the first amendment only in the
limited situation where (1) the property 28 has assumed "to some
significant degree the functional attributes of public property de-
voted to public use,''29 (2) the thought to be communicated re-
lates directly to the property30 and (3) no reasonable alternative
means is available by which the thought can be communicated.3 '
When must private property be opened to the free exercise of
22. 14 Cal. 3d at 910, 537 P.2d at 1242, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
23. Peterson v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973); Velez
v. Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250 (D. Conn. 1974); United Farm Workers
v. Mel Finerman Co., 364 F. Supp. 326 (D. Colo. 1973); Franceschina
v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331
F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
24. See cases cited note 23 supra.
25. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Em-
ployees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968),
rev'd, Hudgeons v. NLRB, 44 U.S.L.W. 4281 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976); Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
26. For the direct relation test see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,
565 (1972).
27. 14 Cal. 3d at 920, 1237 P.2d at 1249, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
28. See cases cited note 25, supra.
29. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972).
30. 407 U.S. at 564.
31. Id. at 567.
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first amendment rights?32 The test of assuming the functional
attributes of public property of Central Hardware will not apply
to the fruit company's orchard because there is no open-ended in-
vitation to the public to use the orchard for any purpose.33  Even
if the property does serve some function traditionally served by
public property, access need not be permitted where an alternative
forum for the exercise of first amendment activity can be demon-
strated and where the picketing bears no direct relation to the use
to which the private property is being put.3 4 Under Central Hard-
ware, the owner of the labor camp located on private property can-
not be subjected to the demands of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments.
The court found that the tenants and occupants of migrant labor
camps have a right to the free flow of information and visitors.
The position of rightful occupants of land would appear to be greater
than that of a pamphleteer exercising the right of the general pub-
lic's access to shopping center malls. The "rights of ownership of
the land . . . must bend to the countervailing rights of those per-
sons rightfully living on his land. "3 15 Lodging employees on private
property cannot provide immunity from the free flow of ideas and
information.3 6 The exclusion of a right of access to the labor camp
would deprive the organizers of their only effective forum of com-
munication 3 7 because there are no public streets on which first
amendment activities could be carried out. N.L.R.B. v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co.3 8 held that union organizers who seek to solicit union
membership may intrude on an employer's private property if no
alternative means exist for communicating with employees. Where
reasonable attempts by non-employees to communicate through
usual channels with employees is ineffective because of the inac-
cessibility of employees, the right to exclude from property has
been required to yield to the extent necessary to permit communi-
cation of information on the right to organize.' 9 For migrant
32. Under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970),
the protection of union organizational activity does not extend to
agricultural employees. Id. § 151(c). Thus, there was no statutory
right of protection for the organizational picketing in the instant case.
33. 407 U.S. at 565.
34. Id. at 564, 566. See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV.
1, 127 (1972).
35. 331 F. Supp. at 623.
36. 478 F.2d at 83.
37. Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. at 567.
38. 351U.S. 105 (1956).
39. Id. at 112. But see Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539
(1972), where the Court held that the allowable intrusion on prop-
erty rights is limited to that necessary to facilitate the employee's
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workers located in a labor camp on company property, there seems
to be no adequate forum except the labor camp itself.4 0
The California Supreme Court held that short of a trial, under
the first and fourteenth amendments to the federal Constitution
and article I, section 2 of the California constitution, labor picket-
ing may be curtailed only after the defendant has had notice and
opportunity to be heard, or when the plaintiff has made a rea-
sonable and good faith effort to give notice. 41  The court invali-
dated the ex parte restraining order of the trial court which had
limited the mass picketing to a specified number of pickets spaced
at certain minimum intervals.4 2
First amendment protection is afforded labor picketing because
"picketing involves expressive conduct within the protection of
the First Amendment. ' 43 To the extent that free speech interests
are present in peaceful picketing, then ex parte restraint without
notice or opportunity to be heard constitutes an impermissible prior
restraint upon first amendment freedoms. Where an alleged depri-
vation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that
no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary as grounds
for denying a motion for preliminary injunctive relief.44
§ 157 (29 U.S.C. § 157) rights. 407 U.S. at 545. Thus, where agricul-
tural workers have no rights under the N.L.R.A., there is no right to
intrude on private property.
40. Because the labor camp is the residence of the migrant workers, rea-
sonable limits may be imposed upon organizational activity there,
under the general rule for residential picketing. Velez v. Amenta,
370 F. Supp. at 1257 (D. Conn. 1974); United Farm Workers v. Mel
Finerman Co., 364 F. Supp. at 329 (D. Colo. 1973); Peterson v. Talis-
man Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d at 83 (5th Cir. 1973).
41. 14 Cal. 3d at 912, 537 P.2d at 1243, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 883. The court
continued to recognize an exception where violence is present in the
dispute. See Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
42. Neither the number of pickets allowed, the spacing intervals nor the
formula used by the trial court is set out in the opinion. For a statu-
tory definition of mass picketing, see NEB. REV. STAT. §28-814.02 (Re-
issue 1975) (two pickets within fifty feet of any entrance or within
fifty feet of any other picket).
43. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972). See, e.g., Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Carpenters Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe,
315 U.S. 722 (1942); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490 (1949); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Teamsters
Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); American Radio Ass'n v.
Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
44. A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(any delay in the exercise of first amendment rights constitutes irre-
parable injury); Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm'n, 284 F.2d 631
(4th Cir. 1960) (no discretion to deny relief when clearly established
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Although labor picketing involves expressive conduct within
the first amendment, it constitutes more than "pure speech. '45 This
is so because ". . . it involves patrol of a particular locality and
since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one
kind or another quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which
are being disseminated. Hence, those aspects of picketing make
it subject of restrictive regulation. ' 46  Where picketing involves
more than publicity, competing state interests allow the state to
enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing the effectuation of
public policy.47
United Farm Workers held that notice and a hearing are re-
quired prior to enjoining mass picketing down to a numbers and
distance formula as utilized by the trial court. Because picketing
is more than pure speech, it seems theoretically possible to enjoin
those aspects of picketing which constitute more than pure speech.
Picketing maintained in the form of massing of persons resulting
in coercion by the mere force of numbers has been held not to be
within the constitutional guarantee of free speech and assem-
blage.4 If the courts can enjoin picketing in mass, then the court
can reduce or dissolve the mass by limiting the number of pickets.
49
To the extent that the aspects of picketing which constitute more
than free speech are divisible from the free speech aspects of picket-
ing, then mass picketing may be enjoined down to a numbers and
distance limitation to restrain the non-speech aspects such as vio-
lence, physical coercion and intimidation. Review by the courts
of picketing that involves more than an expression of ideas is a
that plaintiff is being denied a constitutional right); Glenwal Dev.
Corp. v. Schmidt, 336 F. Supp. 1079 (D. P.R. 1972) (no need to exhaust
administrative remedies in order to seek injunctive relief from viola-
tion of constitutional right); Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp.
901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (deprivation of first amendment rights consti-
tutes irreparable and immediate injury); Brass v. Hoberman, 295 F.
Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
45. American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974);
Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Carpenters Local 213
v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
46. Bakery Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) (Doug-
las, J., concurring).
47. 354 U.S. at 293.
48. Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.
287 (1941); United States Elec. Motors, Inc., v. United Elec. Workers
Local 1421, 166 P.2d 921 (Super. Ct. Cal.; Los Angeles County 1946).
49. Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Milk Wagon Drivers
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941). For an
example of a statutory limitation on mass picketing, see NEB. RaV.
STAT. § 28-814.02 (Reissue 1975).
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review of the balance struck by a state between picketing involv-
ing more than publicity and the competing interests of state
policy.50 When effective channels of communication remain open
under a numbers and distance formula used to prevent violence
and assure reasonable access, ex parte restraint of mass picketing
would not be a prior restraint upon the free speech aspects of
picketing because the expressive element will not have been sup-
pressed.51 The result in United Farm Workers seems wrong when
viewed with an eye to the fact that non-speech aspects of mass
picketing may be enjoined without restraining free speech. 52
The second basis for the court's decision that the ex parte re-
straining order could not stand turned on the fact that the request
was for a temporary restraining order-a purely interlocutory de-
cree which is not final and does not determine the suit.5 3 To grant
a restraining order at this stage of the proceedings would affect
only one party to the action-the picketers who are being re-
strained.54  Granting a restraining order gives the fruit grower
tremendous leverage in the contest. By the time of the hearing
to replace the temporary restraining order with a preliminary in-
junction, the fruit crop already would be harvested. In essence,
granting the temporary restraining order had the effect of giving
the fruit grower all the relief which could be obtained by a final
decree.55
50. American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974);
Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
51. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); cf. Davis v. Francois, 395
F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1968) (invalidating a Louisiana anti-picketing or-
dinance); Medrano v. Allee, 347 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (inval-
idating a Texas mass-picketing statute for overbreadth and vagueness),
rev'd in part, 416 U.S. 802 (1974).
52. The restraining order must be narrowly drawn and must satisfy the
requirements of due process. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Waegele, 29
Cal. App. 3d 681, 105 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1972). The
court construed CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 527 (West Supp. 1976) so as to
narrow the scope of the statute to a "situation requiring special pro-
tection to a state or creditor interest." 29 Cal. App. 3d at 686, 687,
105 Cal. Rptr. at 916.
53. California State Univ. v. NCAA, 47 Cal. App. 3d 533, 121 Cal. Rptr.
85 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1975).
54. The injunction cannot preserve the so-called status qguo ....
The suspension of activities affects only the strikers; the em-
ployer resumes his efforts to defeat the strike, and resumes
them free from the interdicted interferences. Moreover, the
suspension of strike activities, even temporarily, may defeat
the strike for practical purposes and foredoom its resump-
tion, even if the injunction is later lifted.
F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 15, at 201 (1930).
55. Major v. Sowers, 297 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. La. 1969); Knuppel v. Adams,
12 Ill. App. 3d 708, 298 N.E.2d 767 (1973); City of Monmouth v. Payes,
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IV. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Notice and opportunity to be heard now are required in all
California cases where substantial free speech interests are at
stake, unless shown that it was not reasonably possible to notify
the opposing counsel and to provide an opportunity to be heard.5 6
But little guidance is given by the court as to what type of notice
and hearing are constitutionally adequate. The court declined to
state any specific procedural steps which would satisfy minimal
procedural due process in all cases.
The purpose of the holding that notice is required must rest
upon the notion that proceedings without notice are inherently sus-
pect. Failure to give notice offends our traditional ideas of fair
play when notice can be given easily and quickly. Since notice
implies the right to be heard, what type of hearing is required? A
hearing requires trial of an issue or issues of fact. Trial of issues
of fact necessitate opportunity for both sides to present evidence
and an opportunity for both sides to argue the effect of the evi-
dence to the court.57 How far does United Farm Workers require
the court to proceed? Of course, informal notice and a hastily
arranged hearing must be preferred to no notice at all.58 The form
of notice most reasonably calculated to give actual notice must be
employed. 59 To the extent that the procedure of ex parte restrain-
ing orders is unavailable when substantial free speech interests
are at stake, then the procedure followed in granting temporary
39 Ill. App. 2d 32, 188 N.E.2d 48 (1963). Contra, United States v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per
curiam sub nom. Bartlett v. Urited States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971).
56. 14 Cal. 3d at 914, 537 P.2d at 1245, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 885. See FED.
R. Crv. P. 65(b). "The amended subdivision [65(b)] continues to
recognize that a temporary restraining order may be issued without
any notice when the circumstances warrant." Proposed Rules of
Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 125 (1966) (Advisory Committee's
Note).
57. Sims v. Greene, 161 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1947).
58. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v.
Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423 (1974); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Many judges have properly insisted that, when time does not
permit of formal notice of the application to the adverse party,
some expedient, such as telephonic notice to the attorney for
the adverse party, be resorted to if this can reasonably be
done.
... The subdivision [Rule 65(b)] is amended to make it
plain that informal notice, which may be communicated to the
attorney rather than the adverse party, is to be preferred to
no notice at all.
39 F.R.D. at 124-25.
59. 339 U.S. at 314-15.
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injunctions seems like the next logical alternative. That procedure
is notice and affidavits presented by both sides. If the allegations
are conflicting, oral testimony ought to be heard; otherwise, the
trier of fact is left in the position of preferring one affidavit over
another. The emphasis, whatever the procedure to be worked out,
after United Farm Workers should be to afford both sides a fair
opportunity to present their side prior to the issuance of injunctive
relief.
David G. Wondra '77
